İNSAN HAKLARI İZLEME ÖRGÜTÜNÜN "AÇIK ÇEK" BAŞLIKLI RAPORUNA  İLİŞKİN BASIN AÇIKLAMASI

• Gözaltı kararına itiraz mümkündür.
• Gözaltı süresince serbest bırakılma her zaman talep edilebilir.
• Talep halinde, karar Sulh Ceza Hâkimliğince verilecektir.
• Gözaltında avukat yardımı mümkündür.
• Gözaltına giriş ve çıkışta mutlaka sağlık raporu alınmaktadır.

                                                                                                     

1. It is considered necessary to make explanations on the following points for the purpose of providing correct information to the public concerning the allegations in the report of the Human Rights Watch, titled “A Blank Check: Turkey’s Post-Coup Suspension of Safeguards Against Torture” and issued on 24 October 2016.
2. First of all, the public should be informed of the fact that the Report in question was prepared one-sidedly and in a way incompatible with the concrete facts, without any contact with the Government authorities and without any request for information, document or opinion. Moreover, the relevant Report gives the impression that it was prepared under the influence of the members of the Fetullahist Terrorist Organization/the Parallel State Structure (“FETÖ/PDY”) and those having connection and contact with this organization. 
3. It should also be emphasized that the FETÖ/PDY was established as a terrorist organization by independent courts and the National Security Council[1] even prior to 15 July 2016. At international level, the FETÖ/PDY has been declared a terrorist organization by the Resolution No. 47/43 POL of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Furthermore, in the Memorandum of 7 October 2016 issued by the Commissioner of Human Rights of the Council of Europe concerning Turkey, the Commissioner has stated that he understands that the Turkish authorities identify the FETÖ/PDY as a terrorist organisation and see the measures taken against this organisation within the fight against terrorism, and he notes that he does not question the prerogative of the Turkish authorities or the fact that they have very valid arguments to do so. Nevertheless, it is considered worrying that in the report, the leader of an armed terrorist organization attempting to overthrow the democratic order has been indicated as “a cleric” and that an armed terrorist organization has been indicated as “the Gülen movement”.   
4. The measures taken by Turkey after the terrorist coup attempt of 15 July comply with the fundamental human rights set out in our Constitution, the principles of the rules of law and our international obligations. Furthermore, our existing cooperation based on constructive dialogue with the Council of Europe, of which Turkey is a founding member, the United Nations and other international institutions and organizations increasingly continues in this process.
5. In this respect, it is considered useful to share information about the incidents occurred during the armed coup attempt and the subsequent developments.

6. At the night of 15 July, upon the instruction of the founder and leader of the FETÖ/PDY, Fetullah Gülen, and in line with the plan approved by him, “terrorists in uniforms” within the Turkish Armed Forces ("the TAF") attempted an armed coup against the democracy for the purpose of overthrowing the elected President, the Parliament and the Government by undermining the Constitutional order. The Presidential Compound, the hotel where Mr. President was staying at, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (“TGNA”), the Police Special Operations Centre and the security units, the premises of the National Intelligence Organization (“the NIO”) and various military units were attacked with bombs and arms. The Bosphorus bridges connecting Asia and Europe were closed to traffic due to the tanks used by the terrorists.
7. Mr. President survived the assassination attempt by leaving the hotel only 15 minutes before the raid on that hotel. The coup plotters opened fire on the convoy of Mr. Prime Minister. 
8. The Turkish Parliament building, reflecting the public’s will and the heart of the democracy, was bombed for the first time in the history of the Republic of Turkey. The bomb attack was made in the course of the extraordinary meeting of the Plenary Session against the coup attempt. During the attack, Parliament officials, some civilians and many police officers were injured, and extensive damage was caused to the Parliament building.

10. The terrorists seized the state-run television (“TRT”) and forced the host to read “a pirated declaration of coup”. Raids were made to the private media organizations, and the media, which is the news source for the public, was tried to be made to act with a single-voice. The coup plotters also attacked the satellite control station and wanted to cut off the internet and all television broadcastings, except for the state-run TV channel.
11. While 246 persons, including Mr. President’s very close work friend, became martyrs, 2.194 persons were severely or slightly injured during the coup attempt. At that time, a clash occurred between the citizens and the coup plotters. 29 persons were martyred and tens of people got injured just around the Presidential Complex.

12. The Turkish public, upon the call of Mr. President, defended their democratic values and their own will against tanks, helicopters and aircrafts with only their flags and without any weapon. The coup attempt was suppressed by our President, Parliament, Government, political parties, written and visual media, non-governmental organizations, and above all by the esteemed 79 millions of Turkish Nation, who put all of the political and ideological differences aside and protected to death their elected President, Prime Ministry, Government, willpower, Constitution, the rule of law, freedom, dignity, independence and future.
13. At that night the Turkish public came together under the democratic values without making any discrimination as regards political parties or worldviews and resisted the coup attempt altogether. All segments of the public acted with the consciousness that it was not merely a coup attempt planned against the ruling party, but that the Turkish democracy was targeted. In all public squares in Turkey, the public was on democracy watch for approximately one month. With this stand, the Turkish nation has declared its loyalty to the democracy.

14. The unity and solidarity among the nation at the night of 15 July continued among the political parties as well. The statement prepared at the Parliament against the coup was signed by all the political parties. The participation of the leaders of the ruling party and the opposition parties in the Yenikapı Democracy and Martyrs rally of 7 August which was organized under the auspices of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey is an indication of this unity and solidarity. Approximately five (5) million people from every segment of the society and with different world-view convened and protected democracy and the national will.

15. The coup attempt of 15 July was performed in accordance with Fetullah Gülen’s orders and instructions, by the members of the FETÖ/PDY, who had nested in an insidious way into the TAF, public officials and civilians who are the organization head[2], members of the FETÖ/PDY infiltrated into the security forces and the gendarmerie and police officers who had previously been dismissed from profession. The evidence obtained so far also explicitly reveals this truth. The fact that the coup attempt had been made in line with Fetullah Gülen’s orders and instructions is also included in the statements of the organization members who had been questioned within the scope of the investigations conducted. Those who were heard as a witness, notably the Chief of General Staff, gave statements in that vein.
16. Within the scope of the investigations conducted into the coup attempt, many coup plotters, who had participated in the coup attempt, were taken into custody, and a great deal of evidence was obtained at the end of searches performed. The truth has become evident in all aspects as a result of the deciphering, analysis, classification and assessment of the evidence (camera footages, computer data, information, documents and data obtained as a result of the body searches performed on the suspects, searches carried out in the suspects’ homes, vehicles and in other places, records of the city surveillance cameras, mobile phone conversations, SMS and mail contents, statements involving confession, witnesses’ statements and etc.).
17. The FETÖ/PDY is an armed terrorist organisation established by Fetullah Gülen which aims to suppress, debilitate and direct all the Constitutional institutions and to overthrow the Government of the Republic of Turkey and establish an oppressive and totalitarian system through resorting to force, violence, threat, blackmailing and other unlawful means.
18. With a view to realizing such aims, a parallel structure was established by the FETÖ/PDY within all public institutions and organisations of the State, notably the judiciary, security directorates, civil administration and armed forces. To attain its goals, the FETÖ/PDY used the methods of unlawfully obtaining the exam questions of important exams such as the Public Personnel Selection Exam and the University Student Placement Exam, thus making its members gain success in these exams, placing them in public institutions and effective schools, causing the persons who are not its members to be dismissed from profession through ensuring that judicial and administrative investigations be initiated by false documents and evidence that are fabricated and placing its members in these cadres.
19. They formed structures in the public institutions as cells the number of members of which is not over five and which are affiliated to an organisation elder-brother[3]. No cell is aware of the other. The reason why this organisation model has been developed is to ensure that even if a cell is revealed, the other cells continuing their activities must not be deciphered. A strict military/hierarchical discipline prevails in the organisation. The FETÖ/PDY established the intra-organizational communication among its members through confidential and encrypted means. It has been established at the current stage of the investigations that encrypted applications such as “Bylock” was used for the intra-organizational communication.
20. The fact that the FETÖ/PDY is an armed terrorist organization had been established with the decision rendered by the Erzincan Assize Court prior to 15 July. Furthermore, numerous cases brought against the organization in question and its members are still pending. By the Resolution of the NSC, the FETÖ/PDY has been included in the list of terrorist organisations; and this decision was presented to the public and appeared in various media bodies. Moreover, all the public institutions along with the public have been informed of this issue as the Recommendations of the NSC have been submitted to the Council of Ministers.

21. Within the scope of the State’s positive obligations, it must be ensured in accordance with the international law that those who attempted to make an armed coup are brought before justice in order to be tried, and the continuing coup threat must be eliminated. Within this context, it is imperative to identify the public officials having a connection with the FETÖ/PDY who have infiltrated into the State in an insidious way and to immediately perform the required procedures in respect of them. Furthermore, it is under the responsibility of the State to take measures to prevent an attack against the will of the nation through undemocratic means from taking place again.
22. With a view to eliminating the risk of armed coup aimed at overthrowing the democratic order established by the constitution and materializing structural arrangements for Turkey where it is impossible to stage a coup, the state of emergency with effect from 21 July 2016 at 1.00 a.m. was announced for a period of ninety (90) days by the Decree of the Council of Ministers under Article 120 of the Constitution. The state of emergency was extended for three (3) months by the decision of the Council of Ministers with effect from 19 October 2016. Turkey has witnessed severe terrorist attacks which cannot be compared with those taking place in other European countries. In this context, given the threat to the democratic and constitutional order posed by the terrorist organizations such as the PKK, the DEASH, the DHKP-C as well as the FETÖ/PDY, which have been observed to act together and in systematic cooperation, it is compulsory for all institutions to take measures necessary for the fight against these terrorist organizations. Regarding these issues, it is apparent that Turkey has not undergone ordinary circumstances. Indeed, it is known that some European countries, which faced with terrorist threat, declared the state of emergency and extended the state of emergency several times.    
23. With the extension of the state of emergency, it has been aimed at taking and completing sound and right decisions more swiftly and effectively given the type and gravity of security threat and problem encountered. 
24. The measures taken during the state of emergency have not caused any changes in the daily life of the public and individuals. Any restriction which would have an influence on daily life has not been imposed on fundamental rights and freedoms. The measures taken have been limited to the issues required by the state of emergency. The decision on declaring the state of emergency has been rendered not for limiting individual rights and freedoms but for the purpose of enabling the State to act more swiftly within the scope of the effective fight against the FETÖ/PDY and other terrorist organisations. It is the State’s most fundamental right to use the legal power in order to protect democratic order and public will.
25. In this respect, the notices of derogation from Convention obligations were given to the Council of Europe and the Secretariat of the United Nations in accordance with Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention” or “the ECHR”) and Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).
26. Indeed, similar to Article 15 of the Convention and to Article 4 of the ICCPR, Article 15 of the Turkish Constitution clearly regulates how the administration must act in such situations. Pursuant to the regulations in question, the principles of “necessity” and “proportionality” have been sensitively complied with as regards the measures taken under the state of emergency in the aftermath of the coup attempt.
27. Besides this, as to the right to life and the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment, it is impossible to provide notices of derogation within the scope of the ECHR and the ICCPR, which is a well-known fact by everyone. In this respect, contrary to the baseless and unsubstantial allegations raised in the relevant Report, the State’s obligations with respect to the right to life and the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment continue pursuant to the Constitution in the first place.

28. As a consequence of the policy of zero tolerance to torture, Turkey is one of the few countries in the world that lifted the time limitation for the offence of torture. The fact that any kind of allegation of torture and ill-treatment is examined by an independent and impartial judicial authority is without a shadow of a doubt.
29. Pursuant to Article 92 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) and Article 26 of the Regulation on Arrest, Custody and Statement-taking; by force of their judicial duties, chief public prosecutors or public prosecutors that are assigned inspect the detention places where the persons taken into custody are held, rooms where statements are taken – if any - , the conditions of those persons, reasons and lengths of their custody, all records and processed in respect of arrest and custody.
30. In addition to those, civil inspectors inspect police stations and detention places within the scope of general inspections of provinces and districts that are carried out periodically. Findings, assessments and criticisms with regard to these inspections are written down in inspection reports, which are sent to relevant law-enforcement units in order for them to be followed up and the necessary steps to be taken.
31. Detention places in the 1.203 Police Stations (out of 1.268) countrywide have surveillance camera and imaging systems and a total of 303 detention places tied to the Public Security Branch Offices of 81 provinces have, too. Moreover, installment of surveillance camera systems was completed in 1.946 out of 2.012 detention places within the Gendarmerie General Command.
32. In addition to all these, Law-enforcement Monitoring Commission was established. Accordingly, the aim is to ensure the law-enforcement complaint system to operate more swiftly and efficiently, and improve its transparency and credibility; to record in a central system and monitor the works and processes carried out or to be carried out by the administrative authorities with regard to the offences allegedly committed by the law-enforcement officers or act, attitude or behavior necessitating disciplinary punishment.
33. In the mentioned Report, even though it has been alleged that the monitoring boards of penitentiary institutions and prisons have been closed, this does not reflect the truth. By the Decree Law dated 1 September 2016 and no. 673, only the members of the monitoring boards of penitentiary institutions and prisons were removed from their offices; and these boards continue operating. In fact, new appointments were made to these boards which continue carrying out “monitoring” activities in the penitentiary institutions and prisons.
34. The penitentiary institutions can always be inspected periodically when necessary by the national/international inspection mechanisms.
35. Within the scope of the administrative inspection, the penitentiary institutions are inspected by the inspectors of the Ministry of Justice, controllers of the General Directorate for Prisons and Detention Houses, other officers of General Directorate for Prisons and Detention Houses, chief public prosecutors and public prosecutors responsible for penitentiary institutions.
36. Besides that, the human rights boards of provinces and districts that are set up by the representatives of the non-governmental organizations in the provinces and districts can visit and inspect penitentiary institutions.
37. The Ombudsman Institution and the Human Rights and Equality Institution of Turkey (which is accepted as a national preventive mechanism within the scope of the OPCAT) can carry out on-site examinations to assess the complaints, made by the penitentiary institutions, without permission.
38. Within the scope of the parliamentary inspection, the president and the members of the Human Rights Inquiry Committee of the TNGA or the investigation commissions can visit penitentiary institutions and carry out activities of investigation and inspection.
39. Moreover, the Human Rights Inquiry Committee, the members of the investigation commissions, enforcement judges, personnel of probation services and a panel or persons entrusted by the law can make private interviews with prisoners.
40. Apart from all these inspection mechanisms, a unit was established within the body of the Ministry of Justice to follow up the allegations raised in the media with regard to ill-treatment and torture in detention houses and prisons after 15 July. The relevant unit shall meticulously follow up all kinds of news and comments raised in the media, refer them to the competent authorities to ensure them to be swiftly examined and share the results of the examinations with the public.

41. All the places, including penitentiary institutions and custody centers, where the persons deprived of their freedom have been kept can be inspected by international mechanisms such as the European Committee for Prevention of Torture, the United Nations Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture (SPT) and the UN Special Rapporteur on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
42. ​The Turkish Republic is a Party to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and in cooperation with the European Committee for Prevention of Torture (“CPT” or “Committee”) that is the inspection body for the Convention. As it was before, the Committee in question can always visit the prisons in our country. After 15 July, the Committee was provided with the opportunity to visit out country without application of the procedure of postponing the Committee’s visit, which is allowed by the CPT Convention on the grounds of national defense and public security.
43. As a matter of fact, the visit which was completed on 6 September 2016 is a manifestation of this will and the visit report has not yet been notified to the Government.  Upon the notification of the visit report to the Government, necessary actions will be taken in accordance with the obligations arising from the Convention. That being the case, the fact that the Human Rights Watch issued a call for announcement of the report is considered to result in misinformation of the public.
44. Moreover, it should be taken into account that three (3) applications with requests for interim measures lodged with the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) by a number of persons who were detained on remand following 15^th July treacherous coup attempt and who are still in prisons with the allegations that they have been subjected to ill-treatment and their rights to life are under risk were dismissed. With regard to the mentioned requests for interim measures, the Court did not take into consideration the applicants’ allegations, relying on information and documents submitted by the Government.
45. Furthermore, the studies for the visit to be performed by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture to Turkey are still on-going and it is envisaged that the visit will be performed as soon as possible.

46. By the Decree-laws which were issued within the scope of the state of emergency, a number of regulations have been made concerning the necessary measures which only serve the legitimate aim to be applied during the state of emergency, with a view to increasing the effectiveness of the investigations into the offences against constitutional order. The general provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code are still in force. Regard being had to the large number of members of the terrorist organization who took part in the coup attempt, the period of custody has been increased to a maximum period of thirty (30) days by the Decree law, which is limited to the period of state of emergency. The purpose of this is to duly take the statements of the large number of persons taken into custody, to collect the evidence in favour of and against the suspects and thus to carry out the obligation of effective investigation of the State.
47. Moreover, those under custody, their lawyers or legal representatives, spouses or blood relatives of first or second degree may file a request for immediate release with the magistrate’s judge under Article 91/5 of the Criminal Procedure Code against the written order of the Public prosecutor in this regard.
48. Furthermore, this period applies only to offences committed against the security of the State, constitutional order, national defence, State secrets and terrorist offences as well as offences committed collectively. The period of custody of 30 days was not applied and most of those taken into custody were held for 4 and 5 days.                       
49. It should be re-stated by virtue of their importance that during this period,

• Filing an objection to the custody order is possible.
• A request for release may always be lodged during custody.
• In case of such request, Magistrate’s Judge shall render a decision.
• Legal assistance is available during custody.
• A medical report is always drawn up during placement into custody and release.

50. No general restrictive regulation has been introduced by the Decree-laws issued during the state of emergency with respect to criminal suspects’ benefiting from the assistance of a counsel and their right to defence. With regard to the right to choose a counsel, there has been no obstacle for the suspects and their legal representatives, if any, to benefit from the assistance of a counsel or more than a counsel during any stage of the investigation and prosecution under Article 149 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
51. Moreover, due to the severity of offences imputed on the suspects, it has been rendered obligatory to appoint a counsel, even if they do not request so, by the investigation and prosecution authorities under Article 150/3 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Also, with the amendments made to the relevant regulation, the circumstances which may result in abstaining from acting as a counsel have been eliminated.
52. During the state of emergency, the right to communication of the suspect under custody with his counsel may be restricted to five days at the most, however the statements of the suspect shall never be taken during this period. The reason for introduction of the mentioned provision is to prevent criminal suspects of membership of terrorist organization from applying pressures on those under custody via their counsels and from transmitting information to other members of the organization.
53. Moreover, the communication of detained suspects with their counsels may be restricted by the order of a judge, in the event of a possibility of a threat against society and penitentiary institution, directing the terrorist organization or other criminal organizations, giving orders and instructions to them or transmitting secret, open or crypto messages to them. However, in this case, detained suspects may benefit from the assistance of a counsel to be appointed by the Bar Associations.
54. As a matter of fact, in its Grand Chamber judgment on İbrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom (no. 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08 and 40351/09), the ECtHR found that in case of the existence of compelling reasons, the right to communicate with a lawyer may be restricted during custody, on condition that the procedural guarantees are ensured.
55. Article 153 of the Criminal Procedure Code is in force with regard to the counsel’s power to examine the content of the case-file and to receive copies of the documents. According to this provision, it is not possible to impose restrictions in respect of the records containing the statements of arrested person or the suspect, expert reports and records of other judicial actions during which the mentioned persons are entitled to be present. 

56. In accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code and Article 9 of the relevant Regulation, it is obligatory to receive medical reports in Turkey in cases of arrest and custody with a view to preventing the allegations of torture. Likewise, a medical report is also received upon taking out of custody. In this regard, custody status reports of the suspects under custody are received at intervals of one (1) to three (3) days and reports upon getting into and getting out of detention rooms are also completely received. 

58. The current legislation and the Decree-laws adopted under the state of emergency do not contain any provision granting the public officials an exemption from any penalty for the offences of torture and ill-treatment, or impunity in that regard. During the state of emergency period, no legislative amendment has been made to the laws defining the torture and ill-treatment as an offence.

59. In the Report in question, 13 different allegations of torture and ill-treatment have been raised. It is observed that only two (Incident 6 and Incident 11) out of the thirteen allegations contain concrete information about incidents and persons concerned and that the remaining allegations are of an abstract nature. The circumstances of the concrete allegations can be described as follows:

60. As regards the Incident 6 in the Report, it has been stated that two persons, M.A.G. and M.K., were taken into custody on suspicion of being members of the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLCP). However, these persons gave the police officers false identities on during an ID check performed on 23 July 2016. Since the inquiry conducted in respect of these persons revealed that there were arrest orders issued in respect of them for the offence of being members of an armed terrorist organization, they were taken into custody.  
61. The persons in question refused to eat during the period when they were held in custody. Contrary to the allegations maintained in the Report, they met with their lawyers on numerous occasions. On 25 August 2016 the persons concerned stated that they did not want to continue meeting with their lawyers, and each signed a record containing the statement in question. Since 23 July 2016, which was the date of the commencement of their custody period, the suspects underwent medical examinations in a full-fledged health institution on a regular basis, and those medical reports indicated no sign of ill-treatment or torture. 

62. Incident 11 in the Report concerned E.B. who was taken into custody on suspicion of being a member of the FETÖ/PDY. During the interview conducted on 28 July 2016, E.B. stated that he was fasting; and while he was being taken to the custody room when it was about the time for the fast-breaking prayer, he lost his balance and fell down the stairs.  Thereupon, he was referred to a full-fledged Training and Research Hospital. On the following day, E.B. underwent an operation, and on 19 August 2016 he was discharged from the hospital. On the same day, in the scope of the evidence adduced in relation to the case-file, he was detained on remand on account of being a member of the FETÖ/PDY.
63. Upon the submission of complaint petitions by his wife and mother-in-law to the Antalya Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office in question initiated two (2) separate investigations into the incident. The investigation procedures are still ongoing.

64. It should be emphasized that a large majority of the persons, who were taken into custody in the aftermath of the coup attempt, had been arrested by the security forces at the end of conflicts while some of them had been arrested by citizens. It is natural that persons arrested at the end of the conflicts have certain wounds, and it falls under the scope of the legitimate use of force. 
65. Having regard to the fact that a great majority of persons concerned in other alleged incidents were professional military officers, who are skilled in using firearms and have high physical stamina, it should be noted that those persons might have sustained wounds during the suppression of the coup attempt. 
66. Other allegations which do not contain any specific information on dates and persons concerned are merely abstract allegations. In the event that concrete information is provided, necessary inquiries will be performed and results thereof will be made public.
67. As regards the certain incidents mentioned in the Report, it is observed that the FETÖ/PDY’s Internet website broadcasting abroad was mentioned as reference. The fact that such disinformation-oriented and speculative incidents, which aim to create misleading perceptions in the international community and which are devoid of substantiated facts, have been adduced as evidence is an indication that the Report is far from being objective and neutral. 
68. It must be taken into account that both the judicial processes and the accusations have been attempted to be deviated from their aims and thus the investigations have been tried to misled through unjust applications that originate from the same source, are similar to one another, baseless and lodged in line with the instructions of the organisation before the non-governmental organisations and international institutions operating in the human rights field by the suspects that are members of the FETÖ/PDY or their relatives.

69. The rule of law, democracy and human rights are the fundamental principles of the State of the Republic of Turkey. Even in the face of an armed, bloody and treacherous coup attempt and countless terrorist attacks, the State of Turkey pursues its fight against the terrorist organizations in line with respect for these principles and values, and its international obligations.
70. The main goals sought to be achieved in this extraordinary period are the elimination of the causes that gave rise to the state of emergency, and the transition to ordinary period. To this end, we act with great meticulousness to ensure that all of the regulations introduced comply with our obligations emanating from the international law. The measures taken in this respect pursued the aim of ensuring that the State effectively fights against the terrorist organizations in line with its positive obligations; and they were obligatory, urgent and proportionate measures for a democratic society and a constitutional state order.     
71. In addition, none of these measures decriminalize torture and ill-treatment or provides exemption from punishment for any person. As required by the policy of zero tolerance for torture, the judicial and administrative authorities continue duly examining each and every allegation of torture and ill-treatment and taking the necessary actions in respect of those responsible.